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ABSTRACT
The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections
and the European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media,
and even the victors. Political choices representative of Globalist outlooks saw
defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was below 10% and voting to
remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses demonstrate
that there is a Nationalist–Globalist policy divide, partially rooted in
demographics and authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional
valence factors in explaining the recent choices of the British electorate.
Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the way
democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against
Globalist outlooks, are salient in a way they were not during the height of
Thatcherism, encompass left–right economic concerns and may portend a
new era in British political culture.
I. Introduction
Recent elections and referenda across the globe produced results that may
constitute a pushback against globalization. Majorities of elected officials,
business leaders, and educated citizens in managerial and professional pos-
itions usually favour an integrated world with few trade barriers, liberal immi-
gration policies, and cosmopolitan values, but enthusiasm for these tenets
appears lacking among key voting blocs. The rise of populist parties across
Europe, Donald Trump’s successful White House run, and the British referen-
dum vote to leave the European Union reveal opposition to a broad elite
consensus.
An obvious realization of the anti-Globalist sentiment in Britain is the June
2016 referendum vote for the UK to leave the European Union. While Brexit is
a consequential and headline grabbing event, it is not a one off. In 2015, a
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General Election resulted in the drubbing of the pro-EU Liberal Democrats,
and they did not regain much ground in the “snap election” with their call
for a Brexit rethink. The 2015 election saw a significant rise in the popular
vote share of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which for
now appears to have crested. Their downfall likely is possible only because
both Conservative and Labour MPs signalled their agreement with the popu-
list party’s raisons d’être – removing Britain from the supranational EU and
restrictive immigration politics. Elected officials appear to acquiesce not
because they believe Brexit will be a net positive for the UK but because
they fear defeat and political ruin by the Nationalist tide.
In this paper, a “think piece”, we address the correlates and relevance of
what we call a “Nationalist–Globalist” divide to contemporary British politics.
Within this dimension sits attitudes about Britain’s foreign policy, immigration
policies, and the government’s role in guaranteeing equal opportunity. In con-
trast to the Thatcher period, where foreign and domestic policy attitudes
appear on different axes, these attitudes mesh in contemporary Britain.
What distinguishes our paper from contemporary work on the Nationalist–
Globalist divide is that in contemporary Britain, this ideological division
encompasses traditional left–right economic attitudes. The profile of many
voters on the issues comprising the cleavage does not accord to the choice
offered to them by contemporary British parties and may help to explain
why the party system currently is so unstable.
II. Nationalism against globalism
The intuition behind what we label a Nationalist–Globalist posture is that
nationalism is a “thin centred ideology” (Freeden 1998, 748) because the mul-
tiplicity of ideas and policy positions associated with the term can find a home
across the political spectrum.1 For nationalism to be meaningful, it requires
situation within an ideological camp and juxtaposition against competing
ideas. Nationalism sits comfortably as a form of anti-globalism, and together
these concepts create a general middle rung of a hierarchy explained by
demographics and values such as authoritarianism.2
Globalism as a quasi-belief system takes on many potential forms, with
Steger (2013) distinguishing between “market” and “justice” globalism. In
the economic realm, it involves the removal of state actions to control the
market, deregulation, and removal of barriers that prevent the flow of
capital across borders. Politically, Globalists wish to reduce the power of the
nation-state, take measures to prevent the unilateral use of military force
1This is not the only viewpoint – for a review of the theoretical debate over globalization as an ideology,
see Soborski (2012).
2The hierarchical schema mimics the model of foreign policy attitudes of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987).
2 T. J. SCOTTO ET AL.
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and increase the role of supra-national and non-governmental organizations.
“Justice” comes about from states ceding sovereign functions to international
institutions which solve coordination problems over public goods such as
environmental regulations and pursue a world more equal (and many
would say economically stronger) by allowing the free movements of
people. Culturally, Globalists recognize and often celebrate different values
and backgrounds. Scholars are aware of the role of citizen differences on
aspects of the Globalist divide on political choice. Van der Brug and Van
Spanje (2009) and Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde (2014) argue that the Glob-
alist–Nationalist cleavage is a second and emergent dimension of political
conflict in Europe. Kriesi et al. (2008) and Azmanova (2011) see the potential
for the Globalist–Nationalist conflict to supplant the left–right economic clea-
vage in European politics.
A strategy for populist party success in the 1990s was economic liberalism,
opposition to immigration and supra-national integration, and cultural conser-
vatism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). This tactic affirms the market form of glo-
balism while rejecting its other tenets. As noted in a later paper (McGann and
Kitschelt 2005, 149), critiques of this “winning formula” abound because of
questions as to whether those with Nationalist attitudes on culture, foreign
policy, and immigration endorse neo-liberal economics (e.g. Betz 1996;
Mudde 1996). At the mass level, few scholars view the mass issue space as
uni-dimensional. Foreign and domestic affairs receive consideration as two
different realms and Europe and cultural issues are sources of conflict that do
not co-integrate with small versus big state type economic debates (Kriesi
et al. 2008). When voters prioritize issues on the cultural-justice aspect of the
Globalist–Nationalist cleavage so-called right wing populist parties see
success partially because the supply of parties who favour economic integration
and oppose immigration is low (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009).
There is reason to challenge the assumption that market and justice global-
ism are multi-dimensional in contemporary British politics. The strain of
nationalism emerging post-2008 is distinct from the nationalism that under-
girded the rise of Margaret Thatcher. Broad support for Thatcher-era
reforms (as well as the birth of Tony Blair’s “New Labour”) derived from a “reas-
semblement of the establishment” (Jessop 2016, 133–134) marked by broad
elite consensus favouring a neo-liberal economic programme. There is now
a perception of decades of stagnation among average Britons, and blame
for this lies with neo-liberalism for delivering uneven prosperity. The 2008
financial crisis holds particular relevance as a near cataclysmic failure by
elites, but with little to no accountability among elites. The British public
experienced the pain of austerity, whereas elites continued with business as
usual. To the extent that this account captures the “zeitgeist”, it is hardly sur-
prising that elites who are “tone deaf” to the realities faced by everyday
working citizens gives rise to an electorate desperate for change. In Britain,
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the initial supply of options came from the right, with members of the Conser-
vative Party openly challenging the consensus on Europe and immigration,
but remaining committed to neo-liberalism. UKIP downplayed the economy
as an issue and challenged the divided Conservatives from a uniformly
Nationalist approach to immigration and Europe (Ford and Goodwin 2014).
In the UK, however, we now have the question as to whether, with Jeremy
Corbyn’s capture – and defence – of the Labour leadership via direct elections
and his Party’s surprisingly strong showing in the 2017 General Election, we
have a left-wing anti-Globalist party that now supplies voters with an
option not seen in the party families of Western Europe. Corbyn’s Labour is
unabashedly Nationalist and, at the time of this writing, appears to be at
peace with the need for stricter immigration policies and the decision of
the British electorate to leave the European Union.
In this speculative paper, we argue that it is possible to construct empirically a
clear narrative of the policy correlates of this anti-Globalist anger. An elite Glob-
alist mind-set is one supportive of openmarkets, tolerant of immigration, enthu-
siastic about redistribution and income inequality (with foreign aid generating
particular ire), and one happy to reduce national power thru a preference for
international consensus in foreign policy decision-making. Elite consensus over
the general parameters do not match the mass disunity present in modern
Britain. Indeed, positions taken by opinion leader’s accord with only a minority
of the voters, giving rise to new players, which take advantage of unfilled gaps
in the issue space. In many respects, this is classic Schattschneider-inspired or
Downsian politics – leaders and parties arise by changing the scope of political
conflict. In England, the rejection of the Globalist worldview was evident with
the collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote share and rise of UKIP in the 2015
General Election. The EU referendum and the election of renegade Jeremy
Corbyn in two leadership contests delivered a message to Britain’s two major
parties – co-opt the Nationalist mantra or go down to defeat. In the 2017
General Election, Labour and the Tories succeeded by acquiescing to delivering
Brexit and restrictions on immigration. The Scottish National Party and Liberal
Democrats who did not make peace with these policies performed poorly.
Our approach conceptualizes the new nationalism as the binding of dom-
estic attitudes that are hostile to outgroups with a “Britain first” approach to
international relations. In the next sections, we more fully discuss operationa-
lization of these concepts, and we test whether data supports our story.
Britons feeling left behind by a changing global economy likely do not see
the benefits of immigration, European integration, and comparative advan-
tage. Rather, many view themselves as unfairly shunted aside, and benefits
flowing to groups that do not share their values. To many, the policies advo-
cated by the elite consensus are not the solution to “average citizens” but
indeed the problem. Importantly, we hypothesize those opposed to cultural
or justice globalism are not necessarily warm to economic globalism.
4 T. J. SCOTTO ET AL.
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III. Data and constructing the Nationalist–Globalist posture
In March 2014, a representative quota sample of 5125 respondents from
YouGov’s online British panel completed a questionnaire designed to ascer-
tain their attitudes about the political challenges and issues facing Great
Britain.3 Our hypothesis is that we can classify citizens’ outlooks as a Glob-
alist, Nationalist, or something in between via examining their positions on
five items:4
(1) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”.
(2) “All further immigration to the UK should be halted”.
(3) “The UK needs a strong military to be effective in international relations”.
(4) “The UK doesn’t need to withdraw from international affairs, it just
needs to stop letting international organizations tell us what we can
and can’t do”.
(5) A seven-point bipolar scale with endpoints “Government should get out
of the business of promoting income equality” and “Government
should do more to reduce income inequality”.
We code responses so that higher values indicate greater scepticism
over immigration, non-governmental oversight of British actions, and
income and rights equality and a greater desire to see the UK maintain
a strong military. The average respondent shows scepticism towards the
more “Globalist” positions of respecting equal rights, welcoming immigra-
tion, and seeking diplomatic, multilateral solutions to the world’s chal-
lenges.5 In contrast, the average respondent for the seven-point income
equality scale is at the midpoint (3.53), suggesting that Britons are Nation-
alists on the cultural and justice indicators but not necessarily Globalists on
the economic side.
IV. Validating the Nationalist–Globalist posture: the divided
British populace
To answer the question of whether these five items sit together as a single
posture, we employ two types of latent variable analyses. An initial Confirma-
tory Factor Analysis (CFA) treats responses to the survey items as ordinal and
3The sampling frame excludes respondents residing in Northern Ireland. Data are weighted. Our data
come from a multi-wave data set spanning several years. Our measures of authoritarianism come
from the first wave of the survey, fielded more than two years prior to questions concerning the EU
Referendum we use as one of our dependent variables. Data to replicate empirical analysis are available
via the UK Data Archive: https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/.
4The first four items are five point agree-disagree Likert scales, while the fifth is a self-placement on a
seven-point bipolar scale.
5Space restrictions relegate the table with response distributions of the items to the Online Appendix.
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suggests that a hypothesized single factor model fits the data well.6 The five-
indicator model containing the economic equality measure does not substan-
tially worsen standard approximate fit statistics, suggesting the various
aspects of Nationalism–Globalism can form a coherent measure in contem-
porary Britain. This single factor solution combining foreign and domestic
policy items reflective of what we consider multiple aspects of the National-
ist–Globalist divide contrasts with a factor analysis of similar indicators from
the 1983 British Election Study conducted at the height of Thatcherism.7
To validate our empirical claims further and classify voters for the multi-
variate models to follow, we employ latent profile analysis (LPA) (a
“mixture” model) to ascertain how the 2014 British sample clusters on the
five items. LPA treats the items as continuous and looks for underlying and
unobserved groups with similar means across items while accounting for
the presence of measurement error (Oberski 2016). This technique classifies
voters into simple nominal classes based upon the attitudes tapped by
these five indicators. Optimum fit for the LPA analysis, estimated via Mplus
(v.7.4), occurs by splitting the sample into three profiles.8
Profiles with four and five indicators, with full results presented in
Table 1, yield interesting but slightly different stories. For the four-item esti-
mation (without the “promote equality” indicator), nearly half (47%) of all
respondents fit a “Moderate Globalist” profile. In addition, approximately
25% of the sample we define as “Nationalist” and an additional 29% as
anti-immigrant but having slightly less Nationalist attitudes on the other
indicators.
The three profiles from the five-indicator analysis present an alternative
outlook. Here, we see a larger moderate category (approximately 60% of
the sample). These profile members bend in the Nationalist direction on all
but the income inequality indicators. The other two profiles in the five-item
analysis constitute smaller proportions (compared to the four-item profiles),
but contain distinct average positions. There is a small group of respondents
(11%) in a profile containing stridently Globalist positions on immigration,
equal rights, but favouring income redistribution. In a cultural and justice
6The Online Appendix contains the full results from the CFA. The “income equality” indicator has the
weakest association with the latent variable, but it still points to the contradiction that those most scep-
tical of cultural and justice globalism are moderate on this indicator while the small number supportive
of cultural and justice globalism are highly sceptical of neoliberal economic policies. The different policy
domains are not orthogonal to one another.
7Results from a CFA of the 1983 BES data are in the Online Appendix. A single factor can only explain
domestic policy item responses, with this latent variable explaining a very low percentage of the var-
iance of the foreign policy indicators.
8A Vuong–Lo–Mendell–Rubin Likelihood Ratio test (Vuong 1989) comparing the three-profile solution to
one with only two profiles is significant in both instances. A four-profile solution for the four and five
indicator models did not converge because of “boundary solutions” between the fourth extracted
profile and the immigration indicator (Abar and Loken 2012). Fixing the variance of the indicator to a
very small number allows for a solution, but differentiating between profiles becomes difficult.
6 T. J. SCOTTO ET AL.
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Table 1. LPA of UK respondents based on four and five-indicator models of nationalism/anti-cosmopolitanism.
Profile
% in
profile
Most likely class by latent class
(diagonals) (%)
Income
inequality
Equal
rights
Halt
immigration
Strong
military
Stop taking orders from
international organizations
Four indicators:
Profile 1 (Moderate Globalist) 46.6% 92.9 2.58 2.16 3.12 3.21
Profile 2 (Nationalist) 24.9% 84.8 4.54 3.99 4.32 4.54
Profile 3 (Anti-Immigrant
Moderate Nationalist)
28.5% 80.3 3.43 4.54 3.62 4.03
Five indicators:
Profile 1 (Globalist) 11.0% 92.4 1.21 1.40 1.45 2.66 2.65
Profile 2 (Nationalist) 28.9% 88.3 4.01 4.12 4.71 4.21 4.54
Profile 3 (Moderate) 60.1% 91.2 3.53 3.21 2.96 3.38 3.58
Notes: LPA conducted in Mplus v7.4 with Robust Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Sample size adjusted BIC for four-indicator solution: 57,446.29 (best likelihood value: −28,653.673).
Sample size adjusted BIC for five-indicator solution: 75,853.91 (best likelihood value: −37,841.167). Effective weighted sample size for four-indicator solution: 5023; effective
weighted sample size for five-indicator solution: 5112.
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sense, they are Globalist but in an economic sense, they are not. On matters of
foreign policy, members of this profile are more sceptical of a strong military
while more welcoming of international consensus building. The remaining
profile (29% of the sample) contains respondents deeply hostile to
immigration (mean position on the five-point scale = 4.71), militarist and uni-
lateralist in their outlook, and yet are only slightly more accepting of income
inequality than those residing in the moderate profile. We label this profile
“Nationalist”.9
In summary, the five-indicator LPA places most of the British electorate into
a “moderate” category, but it is important to note that the mean score of the
moderate profile respondents on most of the scales. Further, more than
double the number of Britons fall into a “Nationalist” as opposed to “Globalist”
profile in the five-indicator model. Taken together, these results show that a
substantially large proportion of the British public is at least moderately
Nationalist, with a sizable minority being very Nationalist. However, even
those in the profile most sceptical of cultural and justice globalism do not
find themselves at the extreme end of favouring the laissez-faire approach
often attributed to economic globalism.
V. The demographic and authoritarian correlates of the
Nationalist–Globalist divide
Citizen outlooks along the Globalist–Nationalist divide have important and
understandable demographic antecedents.10 There are meaningful differ-
ences in profile membership based on age, profession, and education.
There are also modest differences based on region, but only negligible differ-
ences in profile membership based on gender.
Highlights from the five-indicator model are that older respondents are dis-
proportionately Nationalist compared to younger respondents (37–17%,
respectively). Working class voters are least likely to have a Globalist orien-
tation (8%) and most likely to fit into the Nationalist profile (34%). White-
collar professionals and managers are far more likely to be Globalist (15%)
and far less likely to be Nationalist (21%) than other occupation groups.
University degree holders are more Globalist than those with less education.
Scotland is home to more Globalists (15%) and fewer Nationalists (22%) than
9To avoid wordiness, we use the terms “Globalist” and “Nationalist” to describe the latent profiles for the
remainder of the paper. We remind readers that those in the former are highly sceptical of weakening
national efforts to regulate the economy, and those in the latter group have attitudes on the matter that
are far from libertarian.
10The Online Appendix presents demographic cross-tabulations for both the four- and five- indicator LPAs.
A simple cut-off differentiates university graduates and non-university graduates because of the vast
press commentary on the more Globalist outlook of those with university experience. For the multi-
variate analyses, robustness checks reveal that key findings concerning the demographic correlates of
the profiles and the relationship between the correlates and political choices remain when controls
for more refined levels of education appear in the models.
8 T. J. SCOTTO ET AL.
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other regions of the UK.11 Interestingly, while the East of England is the region
hosting the highest percentage of respondents in the Nationalist profile
(36%), not far behind them are traditional Labour Party bastions of the North-
east (34%) and Yorkshire and Humber (33%) regions.
In addition to the demographic antecedents, we think there are there is an
important attitudinal disposition that is causally prior to the Nationalist–
Globalist divide – authoritarianism.12 Authoritarianism should affect this
Globalist–Nationalist policy divide because to Nationalists, the nation
already has optimal values and traditional arrangements worth preserving;
violations of societal conventions and order are what “broke things”. Author-
itarianism drives anger and resentment towards the beneficiaries of a more
interconnected and cosmopolitan world – whether rich and educated
urban elites or low-skilled immigrants or minorities – because they are per-
ceived to undermine the core of Britishness (see Stenner 2005; Haidt 2016
for how the Globalist–Nationalist divide can activate authoritarian predisposi-
tions that in more settled time are passive and latent).
Full results of an LPA on three indicators of authoritarianism appear in the
Online Appendix, but similar to the Nationalism–Globalism posture, the UK
electorate divides into three profiles. Approximately 1 in 10 voters (9.8%)
are “Permissive” on this scale, having mean scores suggesting disagreement
that learning obedience and respect is important for children, scepticism
that learning about customs and heritage is important for people, and oppos-
ing the corporal punishment of children. Just under 4 in 10 citizens (38.7%) fit
a more “Moderate” profile, slightly more opposed on average to physically
punishing children but slightly more supportive than not of teaching obedi-
ence and respect and valuing heritage and customs. A large 51.5% of the
British sample have average positions near the high extreme of the scale,
leading to their classification as “Authoritarians”.
Those in the small Permissive Authoritarianism profile are far more likely to
be Globalists in their policy orientation. In the five-indicator profile analysis,
they comprise less than 10% of the sample but account for 41% of those
11An anonymous reviewer wisely noted the irony of weak “Nationalist” opinion in Scotland, a nation within
the UK governed by a “Nationalist” party. This reinforces our above point about the “thin centeredness”
of nationalism, and its need to sit against competing ideas. Aside from making a case for independence,
recent Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) manifestos appear to stand deliberately against ideas espoused
by the governing Westminster Conservatives. Embracing progressive ideas concerning immigration and
the need to be a “post-sovereign” state adhering to norms and rules generated by international organ-
izations build the SNP’s case that Scotland is different (Jackson 2014). For more on the embrace of cul-
tural pluralism and values considered post-materialist by Nationalist parties such as the SNP, see van der
Zwet (2015).
12Three items attempt to capture different facets of authoritarianism outlined by Altemeyer (1981): “Obe-
dience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn” (authoritarian
submission); “Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain
people should be made to show greater respect for them” (traditionalism); and “Parents and other auth-
orities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make
people behave properly” (authoritarian aggression).
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classified as Globalists. Authoritarians comprise just over half the sample
(52%), but 80% and 83% of Authoritarians reside in the four and five indicator
Nationalist profiles. Respondents’ policy outlooks link to core apolitical
predispositions.13
Table 2 reports a multinomial logit estimation of profile membership onto
key demographics, occupational status, Eurosceptic press readership, and
authoritarian profile membership. In the five-indicator LPA, the baseline
respondent with a Moderate Authoritarian profile has a 17% probability of
being in the Nationalist profile. Chances shift to only 6% if the respondent
moves to a Permissive profile and increases to 44% if the respondent has
an Authoritarian orientation. A permissive, university graduate, non-Euroscep-
tic press reading, manager has a simulated probability of 46% of falling into a
Globalist profile and only a 2% probability of falling into the Nationalist profile.
An Authoritarian, working class, Eurosceptic newspaper reading individual has
an extremely low 0.2% estimated chance of classification as a Globalist but a
58% chance of a Nationalist classification. Papers read, class, educational
status, and authoritarian predisposition have a marked relationship with
policy orientations.14
VI. The political consequences of the Globalist–Nationalist
policy divide
Voting and elections: Above results show a clear linkage between the Global-
ist–Nationalist policy divide among the British electorate and demographic
differences and authoritarian predispositions. This section addresses
whether this policy divide is politically consequential, manifesting itself in
voting behaviour and in respondents’ satisfaction with democracy.
Recent analyses of British electoral choice (cf. Clarke et al. 2004, 2009;
Whiteley et al. 2013) give pride of place on the explanatory power so-called
valence forces have in determining voter choice. Close to the vote, valence
factors are non-ideological in nature and include identification with the
parties, reactions to the party leaders and views about performance of the
national economy. In Table 3, we estimate a multinomial logit model
distinguishing between the voter’s choice between the Conservatives, UKIP,
and the Liberal Democrats/Labour that includes the key valence factors of atti-
tudes towards the four party leaders, retrospective economic evaluations, and
13In turn, the authoritarian predisposition links to other apolitical scales such as ones measuring “Big 5”
personality traits (see Sibley and Duckitt 2008). Simulations below utilize the CLARIFY package for
Stata v.14 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
14The relationship between the Nationalist–Globalist posture and Eurosceptic press readership likely con-
tains a degree of endogeneity as does the relationship between media choice and voting behaviour in
the General Election and EU Referendum. We include this variable because we wish to emphasize that,
controlling for media consumption, the relationship between and the posture and political choice still
obtains.
10 T. J. SCOTTO ET AL.
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demographic controls. We add additional dichotomous variables placing the
respondent into their most likely Globalist–Nationalist policy profile.15
The valence factors perform well, but their inclusion does not negate a
distinct role for one’s policy profile. A male, non-university educated,
Table 2. Multinomial logit estimations predicting most likely profile membership.
Four indicator: Five indicator:
Moderate Globalist
vs. Nationalist
Moderate Globalist vs.
Anti-Immigrant/
Moderate Nationalist
Moderate vs.
Globalist
Moderate vs.
Nationalist
Basic demographics:
Male −0.23
(0.16)
−0.40*
(0.15)
−0.29
(0.23)
−0.43**
(0.14)
Age 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.00)
Non-White/Non-
British Origin
−0.17
(0.28)
−0.43
(0.30)
0.26
(0.34)
0.36
(0.26)
University Graduate −0.47**
(0.18)
−0.54***
(0.18)
0.87***
(0.26)
−0.41*
(0.17)
Occupation:
Professional/
Manager
−0.14
(0.18)
−0.60***
(0.18)
−0.33
(0.25)
−0.46**
(0.17)
Public sector 0.37
(0.28)
−0.18
(0.25)
0.04
(0.41)
0.27
(0.23)
Private sector 0.28
(0.29)
−0.17
(0.26)
0.26
(0.45)
0.10
(0.23)
Interface Sector −0.33
(0.23)
−0.04
(0.22)
−0.02
(0.32)
−0.37
(0.20)
Trade Union −0.24
(0.29)
0.11
(0.25)
0.52
(0.29)
−0.71*
(0.29)
Region:
London −0.17
(0.24)
−0.23
(0.25)
0.60
(0.31)
−0.04
(0.22)
Scotland −0.60*
(0.29)
−0.08
(0.25)
−0.72
(0.41)
−0.41
(0.26)
Wales −1.03*
(0.44)
0.08
(0.31)
0.26
(0.42)
−0.75*
(0.36)
News:
Reads Eurosceptic
Press
1.04***
(0.16)
0.50**
(0.16)
−2.06***
(0.47)
0.55***
(0.14)
Authoritarian profile:
Permissive −1.45**
(0.49)
−1.18***
(0.35)
1.52***
(0.27)
−0.96
(0.56)
Authoritarian 1.47***
(0.17)
0.70***
(0.16)
−1.15***
(0.30)
1.33***
(0.16)
Constant: −1.32**
(0.42)
−0.40
(0.39)
−2.80***
(0.64)
−1.65***
(0.35)
Notes: Wave 1 respondents only. Sample Size for Four Indicator Model = 1382; Sample Size for Five Indi-
cator Model = 1396. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(28df): 378.31; Five Indicator Model Like-
lihood Ratio χ2(30df): 484.24. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
15For ease of presentation, Labour/Liberal Democrats combine into a single category. Respondents stating
they did not intend to vote, vote for one of the Nationalist (the Scottish Nationalist Party or Plaid Cymyu)
or minor parties do not appear in this analysis. A model replacing party leader feeling thermometers
with respondents’ partisan identification produces similar results to the model presented in the text
– results available in the Online Appendix.
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working class respondent with average feeling thermometer evaluations of
each party leader and the performance of the economy is estimated to have
13% and 15% chances of voting Tory and 8% and 12% chances of voting
UKIP in the four and five-indicator models, respectively. Moving the respon-
dent away from the Moderate Globalist and Moderate profiles and into the
Nationalist profiles increases the probability of a Conservative choice to 16%
in both the four and five-indicator models. UKIP’s chances increase to 19% in
both models. Additional simulations shifting differences hypothetical
respondents’ feelings about UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Conservative
Leader David Cameron suggest that in most circumstances, UKIP sees a
greater gain than the Tories when respondents move to having a Nationalist
policy profile.
Next, we consider intended vote in the EU referendum circa early spring
2015, which divided the sample nearly evenly with 43% stating they would
vote “Remain” and 40% stating they would “Leave”. Undecided were 17%,
and Table 4 looks at the factors that shift respondents away from ambivalence
Table 3. Multinomial logit estimations predicting voter support for UKIP and the
conservatives.
Four indicator: Five indicator:
Labour/LibDem vs.
Conservative
Labour/LibDem
vs. UKIP
Labour/LibDem vs.
Conservative
Labour/LibDem
vs. UKIP
Globalist/
Nationalist profile:
Nationalist 0.37
(0.27)
1.10***
(0.26)
0.19
(0.20)
0.59***
(0.20)
Anti-Immigrant
Nationalist
0.32
(0.21)
1.17***
(0.25)
XX XX
Globalist XX XX −1.58**
(0.56)
−3.28
(1.51)
Leader
thermometers:
David Cameron 0.97***
(0.05)
0.22***
(0.05)
0.96***
(0.05)
0.20***
(0.05)
Edward Miliband −0.74***
(0.05)
−0.72***
(0.05)
−0.73***
(0.04)
−0.71***
(0.05)
Nick Clegg −0.38***
(0.28)
−0.34***
(0.04)
−0.37***
(0.05)
−0.34***
(0.05)
Nigel Farage 0.14***
(0.40)
0.78***
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.04)
0.78***
(0.23)
Economic
perceptions:
−0.33
(0.23)
−0.04
(0.22)
−0.02
(0.32)
−0.37
(0.20)
National
performance
0.28**
(0.10)
−0.15
(0.10)
0.26*
(0.10)
−0.18
(0.10)
Constant: −3.01***
(0.56)
−1.99***
(0.59)
−2.78***
(0.56)
−1.38*
(0.57)
Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but
not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 wave of the survey. Sample size for
both estimates: 2618. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(38df): 3319.16; Five Indicator Model Like-
lihood Ratio χ2(38df): 3321.38. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
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to a Stay or Leave position.16 This estimation adds the Globalist–Nationalist
Profile of the respondent to control variables frequently identified as corre-
lates of EU referendum voting. These are partisan identification, Eurosceptic
Press readership, and economic evaluations. Included as controls are respon-
dents’ level of agreement with three statements (of varying accuracy) con-
cerning the European Union: (1) that the EU sells more goods to Britain
than vice versa; (2) that European MEPs are paid more than UK Members of
Parliament; and (3) that Britain pays a much higher contribution to the EU
than it should.
Table 4. Multinomial logit estimations predicting EU referendum choice.
Four indicator: Five indicator:
Don’t Know vs.
Remain
Don’t Know vs.
Leave
Don’t Know vs.
Remain
Don’t Know vs.
Leave
Globalist/Nationalist profile:
Nationalist −0.46*
(0.18)
0.64***
(0.18)
−0.32
(0.17)
0.63***
(0.15)
Anti-Immigrant Nationalist −0.54***
(0.16)
0.34*
(0.16)
XX XX
Globalist XX XX 1.15****
(0.24)
−0.19
(0.34)
Party identification:
Conservative 0.29
(0.19)
0.28
(0.19)
0.32
(0.19)
0.32
(0.19)
Labour 0.82***
(0.16)
0.19
(0.17)
0.81***
(0.16)
0.22
(0.17)
Liberal Democrat 1.54***
(0.31)
0.82*
(0.35)
1.59***
(0.31)
0.87*
(0.34)
UKIP −0.41
(0.51)
1.71***
(0.36)
−0.37
(0.51)
1.76***
(0.36)
Economic perceptions:
National Performance 0.20**
(0.07)
−0.04
(0.07)
0.23***
(0.07)
−0.02
(0.07)
EU attitudes:
EU Sells More Goods 0.03
(0.08)
0.24**
(0.08)
0.01
(0.08)
0.22**
(0.08)
EU MEPs Paid More −0.11
(0.08)
0.17*
(0.08)
−0.12
(0.08)
0.17*
(0.08)
UK Contributes Too Much to EU −0.21**
(0.07)
0.51***
(0.08)
−0.17*
(0.07)
0.51***
(0.08)
Newspaper:
Reads Eurosceptic Press −0.13
(0.14)
0.53***
(0.14)
−0.06
(0.14)
0.52***
(0.14)
Constant: −0.60
(0.48)
−4.88***
(0.51)
−1.05*
(0.49)
−4.88***
(0.52)
Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but
not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 and April 2015 waves of the survey.
Sample Size for both estimates: 2378. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(46df): 1131.02; Five
Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(46df): 1170.23. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
16We exclude respondents who said they would not vote in the referendum from Table 4 analyses.
Respondents who answer both the March 2014 and spring 2015 waves of the study appear in this analy-
sis. Questions pertaining to the European Union in the analyses appear in the spring 2015 wave.
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Results displayed in Table 4 are telling as the placement of a respondent
into one of the three profiles in either model is, in many instances just as
potent as partisan identification or more proximate attitudes towards the
European Union. In the model with the four-indicator profile, a non-partisan,
non-graduate male respondent residing outside of London, Scotland, or Wales
with average attitudes towards national economic performance and on the
specific European questions is simulated to have a 41% of intending to
vote “Remain”, 28% chance of wanting to “Leave”, and a 31% chance of
being undecided. In the five-indicator model, the percentages are 33% in
each category. Shifting the respondent to a Nationalist profile increases the
probability of a “Leave” response to 49% and 51% in the models with four
and five indicators and this comes primarily at the expense of the “Remain”
choice. In the four-indicator model, if the respondent instead moves from
the Moderate Globalist profile into the Anti-Immigrant Nationalist Profile,
the simulated probability of choosing “Leave” increases to 42%. For the
model with the five-indicator LPA, moving from a Moderate to a Globalist
profile increases the choosing Remain to 65% and decreases choosing
Leave to only 17%.
To provide an idea of the potency of the effects of shifting away from the
Moderate profiles, additional simulations show that moving our baseline
respondent from no partisan identification to supporting UKIP shifts the prob-
ability for leave to greater than 70%. Moving to supporting the Liberal Demo-
crats produces a strong shift towards Remain. However, the effects of shifting
to the Globalist profile is stronger than the effect of moving from non-identi-
fication to Labour and movement into Nationalism has more of an influence
than shifting towards identification with the Conservatives. This shift is stron-
ger than moving the respondent into a category that has them reading one of
the Eurosceptic papers. The effect of moving the respondent from “Strongly
Disagreeing” that the UK Pays More than it Should into the European Union
to “Strongly Agree” produces a shift in the leave direction of approximately
40% for our hypothetical respondent. Shifts observed from moving from
Strongly Disagreeing to Strongly Agreeing on the other two statements
directly referencing the European Union produce smaller shifts than moving
the respondent from the four and five indicator Moderate to Nationalist pro-
files. Broad based Nationalist–Globalist policy positions are relevant to the
decision to leave or remain in the EU and they trump some measures con-
sidered proximate to the referendum decision.
Democracy: The Nationalist–Globalist policy positioning of citizens is
central to voter choice in recent British elections, but can also shape views
of the overall system. People supporting losing parties and candidates
often show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy then those backing
winners (Anderson and Guillory 1997). We hypothesize that Nationalists,
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who are policy “losers” in an era where globalization dominates are likely to
express lower levels of democratic satisfaction.
Table 5 presents results of a logit estimation differentiating respondents
who express “satisfaction with the way democracy works in Britain”
(coded 1) with those who either do not or are ambivalent.17 In addition to
binary variables for the Nationalist/Globalist profiles, controls for partisan
identification, media consumption, and internal and external political efficacy
are included. Nationalists are less likely to report satisfaction with democracy
in Britain than their Moderate and Moderate Globalist counterparts. By way of
illustration, a respondent with the demographic characteristics of the above
Table 5. Globalism/nationalism and satisfaction with democracy.
Four indicator Five indicator
Satisfaction with democracy Satisfaction with democracy
Globalist/ Nationalist Profile:
Nationalist −0.41*
(0.18)
−0.34***
(0.16)
Anti-Immigrant Nationalist −0.20
(0.17)
XX
Globalist XX −0.12
(0.23)
Party identification:
Conservative 1.07***
(0.20)
1.02***
(0.20)
Labour 1.02***
(0.18)
1.02***
(0.18)
Liberal Democrat 0.72**
(0.27)
0.74**
(0.27)
UKIP −0.45
(0.33)
−0.49
(0.33)
Economic perceptions:
National performance 0.43***
(0.07)
0.42***
(0.07)
Efficacy:
Internal efficacy −0.16
(0.08)
−0.14
(0.08)
External efficacy −0.49***
(0.09)
−0.49***
(0.09)
Newspaper:
Reads Eurosceptic Press −0.07
(0.16)
0.05
(0.16)
Constant: −2.77***
(0.45)
−2.77***
(0.45)
Notes: Demographic, occupational, and regional controls present in Table 2 included in estimations but
not shown due to space considerations. Data from March 2014 and April 2015 waves of the survey.
Sample size for both estimates: 1126. Four Indicator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(22df): 225.20; Five Indi-
cator Model Likelihood Ratio χ2(22df): 224.68. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.
17The “Satisfaction with Democracy” question appears in the May/June 2014 wave of the panel, coming
shortly after the May 22 elections to the EU Parliament. Only 5% of the sample state that they are “Very
Satisfied” but 46% state that they are “Fairly Satisfied” with democratic performance in the UK. This esti-
mation includes only respondents who answered these two waves as well as the larger March 2014
wave.
JOURNAL OF ELECTIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTIES 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
rat
hc
lyd
e] 
at 
01
:59
 21
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
17
 
baseline respondent but who is a Labour partisan is in both the four and five-
indicator models simulated to have an approximately 50–50 chance of report-
ing that they are either “Very” or “Fairly” satisfied with the way democracy
works in the country. Moving the respondent from the Moderate Globalist
or Moderate profile to the Nationalist profile reduces the probability of indi-
cating satisfaction by approximately 10%. This approximates the reduction
we see if the respondent moves from an average to a minimum position on
the internal efficacy factor. Interestingly, Globalists are no more satisfied
with democratic performance than are Moderates.
VII. Discussion
In the aftermath of the “Great Recession”, many British citizens still reel from
financial ramifications linked to the near collapse of the global economy, have
difficulty coping with rapid technological change, and live in a society where
success depends on mobility. A small minority of Britons have the Globalist
outlook, which embraces international cooperation and is open to changes
brought about by immigration and the state facilitating opportunities for
once marginalized groups. However, most oppose this “citizen of the world”
outlook. Nationalists are less open to state intervention than those with a
Globalist outlook are, but our empirical analyses suggest they fall far short
of blindly embracing global neo-liberalism.18
The ability of attitudes on various aspects of the Globalist–Nationalist clea-
vage to cluster in contemporary Britain differs from that observed at the
height of Thatcherism. It is possible to classify the contemporary British elec-
torate by a relatively small number of profiles, and the profiles have demo-
graphic correlates. Although far from deterministic, those eschewing
Nationalist policy type postures predominantly are university graduates in
leading occupational positions with permissive positions on an authoritarian-
ism scale.
A Globalist–Nationalist policy divide among the UK electorate has ramifica-
tions both for how citizens vote and for health of the democratic polity.19 In
recent decades, it became passé to harp on sociological differences in political
choice. Valence factors explain political outcomes when the lines of political
conflict are established (e.g. Clarke et al. 2004). However, the post-2008 politi-
cal world is deeply unsettled and economic changes on the horizon will make
it even less so with politicians unable to offer viable solutions regardless of
18Concerns over economic globalism extend beyond the selected “Government getting out of the business
of promoting income equality” indicator. A question on the panel asking whether trade should be an EU
or a national responsibility reveal that 58% wished the UK to retain authority against the 30% who were
comfortable with ceding power to the EU.
19Although space prohibits a full exploration, estimates contained in the Online Appendix suggest that the
Nationalist–Globalist posture affects the way citizens view institutions such as the judiciary.
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their stated desires to “take back control” (Frankel 2016). Support for parties
and political choice in recent elections does not come down merely to charis-
matic leaders and economic evaluations. To win in contemporary Britain, poli-
ticians both left and right have to capture the Nationalist issue space, and we
witnessed this in the recent referendum campaigns and two 2015 and 2017
General Elections.
That the Globalist–Nationalist posture goes beyond explaining political
choice to affect satisfaction with democracy does not surprise. The distri-
bution on this core policy posture suggests Globalists are a small coterie of
the populace, university educated and in professional occupations, making
the rules for an electorate where the median voter leans in a Nationalist direc-
tion, with at least 1 in 5 residing on a hard Nationalist posture.
What remains to be seen is whether the electoral choices of the UK electo-
rate in the 2015 and 2017 General Election and 2016 Referendum campaign
gives voice to enough people to allow levels of democratic satisfaction to rise.
Pronouncements of Prime Minister Theresa May at the 2016 Conservative
Party Conference and the initial hard lines the Government drew in early
Brexit negotiations appears aimed at assuaging Nationalist sentiment.
Insurgent and successful Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn muted differences
his Party had on the Nationalist–Globalist divide with those of the Tories
during the 2017 campaign. However, the expectations and hopes of the
portion of the electorate wishing to see policy move in an anti-Globalist direc-
tion can go unfulfilled. Globalization is a powerful force and even those in the
Government with a Nationalist “UK First” bent may have to make pragmatic
choices (MacShane 2016). Should Brexit and accompanying ancillary efforts
fizzle, a question is whether this posture may become more salient in
driving party choice, perhaps dampening further democratic satisfaction
and attitudes towards political institutions.
VIII. Conclusion
A simplistic characterization of post-war British political history is one where a
small number of elections set the ideological agenda and, for long periods,
leader competence to manage the political programme determined the
outcomeof elections. The 1945 victory of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party cemen-
ted the notion that the British electorate favoured a generous welfare state.
With the welfare state created, parties and leaders spent much of the 1950s
and 1960s debating who could serve the electorate better in fashioning and
providing generous benefits. Union unrest and economic uncertainty due to
high inflation called into question the consensus over the Governments’ abil-
ities to manage centrally the national economy (King 1975).
The Thatcher victory of 1979 smashed once widespread agreement sur-
rounding the utility of a vast welfare state, and the calamitous defeat of
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Michael Foot’s fragmented Labour party in 1983 was a further nail in the coffin.
From this period to the economic crisis of 2008, politics centred on debates over
effective management of a society where semi-privatized public services and
industries were increasingly not under the direct control of the state. In this
era, bargaining powers of workers weakened, and the British economy increas-
ingly was subjected to the “golden straightjacket” (Friedman 1999) of global
capital and multinational corporations (Bogdanor 2006).
Post-Thatcher, the question of British politics was management of the glo-
balized “new normal”. When Thatcher went from “resolute and determined”
to “stubborn and inflexible” (Denver 2011, 87), John Major replaced her.
When voters poorly assessed his leadership capabilities in stepped Tony
Blair. The Labour Leader to paraphrase Dillow (2007), aimed to govern effi-
ciently with a mandate towards promoting equality and a centrist political
agenda. The assumption was that good management could replace the divi-
sive left–right ideological politics that characterized the early Thatcher years
and saw Labour in the doldrums. Unfortunately, for technocrats and many
Globalists, policies and their implementation often involve trade-offs.
Brexit muted the EU as a voting issue. Jeremy Corbyn proved surprisingly
deft at making peace with the need for immigration restrictions, downplayed
his dovishness on military matters, and kept Labour’s “true” position on Brexit
muddled during the 2017 General Election campaign. Underappreciated by
pundits was Corbyn’s Labour’s shift in the direction matching mean positions
of the Nationalist profiles on matters of cultural and justice globalism. His per-
sonal characteristics aside, Corbyn’s positions likely were palatable to anxious
Nationalist voters. Parties embracing globalism, the Liberal Democrats and
Scottish National Party, underperformed in the 2017 General Election.
Corbyn’s Labour has established credibility on economic nationalism –
unlike “New Labour”, nobody could claim Corbyn and his front bench allies
have any sympathy for a globalized neo-liberalism. Brexit helps to fulfil the
electorate’s preferences on cultural and justice nationalism, but does little
to present an alternative to economic globalism to the financially hard-
pressed British public. Although heavily criticized, the economic vision pro-
jected by Jeremy Corbyn seems more in tune with the preferences of the
British electorate than Theresa May.
In a weak economy with Brexit looming, it remains to be seen whether
even a Labour Government can allay voter anxieties via redistributive policies
that build up the skills and hopes of the “left behinds”. Even with a renewed
government focus on tempering the negatives associated with global neo-lib-
eralism, the question for Nationalists likely will turn to whether or not they
benefit from redistributive policies. The perception is that benefits flow dis-
proportionately to immigrants and those on board with the so-called equal
rights agenda. In the wake of two divisive General Elections and a Referen-
dum, the consequences of not addressing the problem of status anxiety
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and the declining relative position of a large portion of the electorate seem
clear. We may be moving into an era where elections hinge on an unsettled
Nationalist–Globalist cleavage, one without a crosscutting alternative, and
the debate centres around increasingly negative variants of the “thin ideol-
ogy” of nationalism rather than on the valenced decision of choosing the poli-
tician who best can deliver on shared and consensual objectives.
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